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Executive Summary
Competition law is an important area of Community law. It influences a lot of the everyday business
of companies all over the world. The two most important regulations are Article 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty. These are the base for the competition authorities and also for the institutions within the
Community when it  comes to  issuing different  types of regulations.  Article  81 is  addressed to
companies  and  regulates  the  situations  when  two  undertakings  enter  into  agreements.  If  these
agreements fulfill  the criteria in the article they are considered to be in conflict  with European
Competition Law, and shall therefore be considered void. The 3rd paragraph of Article 81 does
however contain exemptions that can make it possible for the companies to uphold their agreement
even if it fulfills the first part of the article. Article 82 regulates the situation when one or more
dominant undertakings act on the market. An undertaking is not prevented from holding a dominant
position on the market but when there is an abuse of this position competition rules are there to
regulate this conduct. There is a clear connection between Article 81 and 82. They can be applied to
the same agreement and the application of Article 81(3) does not prevent the application of Article
82. It has been made clear that Article 81(3) cannot be applied to permit an abuse of a dominant
position.
Licensing is an area that is growing rapidly and that is becoming more and more important on the
market. This area is under great influence from competition rules and there are several different
Community regulations that has to be considered. One of the most important ones is the Technology
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation.  This regulation has undergone changes lately and a new
block  exemption  was  adopted  last  year.  Some  major  changes  were  made,  mainly  so  that  the
regulation now has an economic and effect-based approach instead of the old legalistic and form-
based approach. One of the changes important for this thesis is that software now is included in the
TTBER. This means that licensing of software will have a new regulation to take into account when
conducting business.  Critique has  been heard that  the new TTBER is  not  adapted for  software
licensing and that this will create problems. Since the TTBER is not even a year old yet it is hard to
say if there are any big difficulties for the software industry.
In  relation  software  licensing  it  is  important  to  consider  the   Council  Directive  on  the  legal
protection of computer programs. Interoperability is regulated by this directive and that is important
when it comes to software and software licensing. It is often in relation to Article 82 EC that these
kind of questions arise since it can be an abuse of dominant position to prevent competitors from
being able to create programs that interact with these of the dominant undertaking. There has been
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some interesting decisions from the Commission and judgments from the European Court of Justice
on this matter. The most recent one that has gotten a lot of media attention is the Microsoft decision
where Microsoft was obliged to release interface information to competitors so that interoperability
was achievable.   
As will be seen in this thesis, there are several things that has to be considered when it comes to
licensing in the European Community. As mentioned, the TTBER is one of the most important
regulations  to  keep  in  mind  and  it  can  give  a  lot  of  companies  guidance  when  it  comes  to
concluding  agreements.  If  the  companies  fall  below the  market  share  threshold  set  out  in  the
TTBER many clauses in the agreements will be permitted even if they would not have been if the
companies would have had bigger market shares. The market shares is one of the big difficulties in
the TTBER since the assessment can be very hard to do. Depending on the definition of relevant
product and technology markets the market shares can differ. The rules in the TTBER are somewhat
different depending on if the actors are competitors or not and that will make the regulation even
more complicated.  The TTBER is  an regulation  that  is  complicated and it  might  require  some
knowledge to apply it. The Commission has issued guidelines to help with this and these guidelines
are  almost  as  important  as  the  regulation  itself.  The  two  documents,  the  regulation  and  the
guidelines shall be read together and seen more as a whole than two separate things.          
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Abbreviations
CFI Court of First Instance
EC European Community
ECJ European Court of Justice
IP Intellectual Property
IPR Intellectual Property Right
OJ Official Journal
R&D Research and Development
TRIPS The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TTBER Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The area of competition law in Europe is an area that has become more and more important over the
years since trade is icreasing rapidly. There are not many companies that can act on the European
market without coming in contact with the competition rules one way or the other. If companies
enter into agreements there are almost  always competition considerations that have to be made.
Even if a company acts alone on the market, competition law may influence how the company can
conduct business. 
When it comes to licensing it is important to have an understanding for the rules regulating this
area. The EC Treaty is constructed to create a balance between Intellectual Property and competition
law but it  is debated if there is any real balance or if the aims of competition law and IP is in
conflict.  This  question  is  interesting  and  something  that  is  important  for  the  IP industry.  The
competition regulations can sometimes be complicated and it  is difficult  to know how to apply
them. These regulations have changed a bit over the last years and a new block exemption with
great  importance  for  licensing  has  been  adopted,  the  Technology  Transfer  Block  Exemption
Regulation. This block exemption differs somewhat from the earlier ones on the same area. One of
the big changes is that software now is included and therefore the software industry has a new
regulation to take into consideration. However, the software industry has another regulation that to
take into consideration as well  and that is the Council  Directive on the protection of computer
programs, the Software Directive1. Both these regulations are closely connected to Article 81 and 82
EC,  the  two  most  important  competition  articles.  My  goal with  this  thesis  is  to  give  an
understanding of some of the considerations that has to be made when dealing with licensing in
Europe and create an understanding for the connection that has to be made to the competition rules.
For a company acting on the European market it might not always be easy to keep track of the
different regulations and how they shall be used and what impact they have in a specific situation.
Hopefully this thesis will help with this understanding and explain some of  the most important
rules.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to look at licensing, and more specific, software licensing in Europe.
Since most licensing is conducted between companies that is where the focus will be. However, the
1 Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42 “The Software directive”
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purpose is also to discuss some of the other licensing situations that may occur, for example refusal
to license and the connection to Article 82. Since licensing between undertakings to a big part is
regulated by the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation a big part of this thesis will
discuss this regulation. Some of the differences between the old and the new technology transfer
block  exemption  regulation  will  be  mentioned  and  application  of  the  new  rules  on  licensing
agreements will  be  made.  The focus  will  be on Articles  4  and 5 of  the TTBER, the hardcore
restrictions and the exempted restrictions. These are the articles that has the most impact on the
relationship between licensor and licensee. I will give an overview over some of the most common
restrictions used in licensing agreements and describe the competitive effects that they might have.
1.3 Method
I have used customary legal method when writing this thesis. I have studied papers, regulations and
guidelines from the European Community and these are the main source of facts. Case law from the
European Court of Justice has been important to understand the reasoning in decisions and other
cases. I have used http://curia.eu.int to find relevant cases for this thesis.  
I have read textbooks  and articles from various sources, all  focused on competition law. When
studying the background work regarding the new TTBER it has been useful reading comments from
different institutions, law firms and competition authorities even if not many of them are used as
actual references in this thesis. 
Different web pages have been useful when it comes to finding different opinions regarding the
TTBER. Some have not been easy to refer to in the source material since not all of them have been
clear about who has written what on these pages and some of them have not even contained a date
for publication. I have listed the web pages I have used, all of which I have visited during the period
from November 2004 and March 2005. 
1.4 Limitations
The biggest part of the thesis will focus on licenses between undertakings and thereby the TTBER.
There will not be any deep analysis of the block exemption but rather a overview and an description
on how the rules can be applied in a specific situation. The part about Article 82 EC and thereby
companies in a dominant position on the market will be limited to one chapter. I do consider it to be
important to include it  in this  thesis  since it  in may situations are important to the market  that
licenses from such actors are granted. In regard of Article 82, tying will not be discussed more than
briefly. The focus will be on interoperability.
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1.5 Disposition
Chapter 2 will describe the competition regulations that is most important to this thesis, Article 81
and 82 of the EC Treaty. Focus will be on Article 81. The description will be short since there are
no room in a thesis of this size to make a deep analysis of the different elements in the articles. 
In Chapter  3  the  competitive  rules  will  be  discussed  in  the  light  of  technology licensing.  The
discussion will to a great extent cover general licensing and not be specific to software. However,
much of what is said is also applicable to software licensing. A description of what can be anti-
competitive with licensing agreements will be included but also an description of how licensing
agreements can be good for the competitive climate on the European market. Chapter 4 will give a
short  description  of  the  Software  Directive  issued  by  the  European  Council  in  1991.  This  is
important  to  understand  some  parts  in  the  following  chapters.  Chapter  5  will  go  through  the
technology transfer block exemption and compare it to the older one. What needs to be considered
when making individual assessments under the TTBER will be mentioned in chapter 6. Chapter 7
will be used for a brief overview of the possibilities for licensing when it comes to an actor with an
dominant  influence  on  the  market.  Finally,  chapter  8  will  sum up and analyze what  has  been
discussed in the thesis.    
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2. Introduction to EC Competition Law
2.1 What is Competition Law?
Competition law can be said to be a group of regulations that have their base in the economic policy
and has the intention of regulating how companies conduct business and behave on the market
arena.  The  rules  can  be  said  to  be  sort  of  a  “Commercial  Code  of  Conduct”  that  limits  the
possibilities to enter into certain types of agreements or to use economic power in ways not in the
interest of consumers. Two recurring themes of competition policy can be identified, the protection
of the interests of the consumers and the needs of national or European industrial policy. European
competition policy have an additional overriding objective, that national competition laws do not
have; to ensure that industry in Europe does not prevent the creation of a single market for goods
and services in the European Union.2
Competition rules exist both on national and European level but the European rules often define
what approach the national competition authorities take. It is also common that national laws follow
or reproduce the European rules.  
2.2 Purpose of Competition Law
“The prime purpose of competition policy is, in our view, to promote and maintain a process of
effective  competition  so  as  to  achieve  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources”3 This  extract
suggests  that  competition  law has as its  main objective to  achieve efficiency and that  it  is  the
competitive market that will be able to achieve this efficiency in the best way. What the actual aim
of  EC competition law is is not that easily found and there are and have always been many different
and  contested  views  about  the  original  aim4.  What  is  clear  is  that  competition  policy  has  an
important role in the creation of a single market within the European Union. It can therefore be said
that the EC competition rules “serves two masters, the competition one and (even more demanding)
the imperative of single market integration”5. The competition rules has also played an important
role in the Community's development.  This is  reflected in  the Commission's  Annual  Report on
Competition Policy, for example in the XXIIIrd Report from 1993. There the relationship between
competition policy and industrial policy is discussed:
2 Kinsella, S, “EU Technology Licensing”, pg.1
3 Vickers, J and Hay, D, “The Economics of Market Dominance”
4 Craig, P and de Bùrca, G “EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials”, pg. 41
5 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 36
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“Competition policy has a central role to play in the Community's strategy for achieving a lasting
recovery in growth and employment.6
Competition  encourages  the  efficient  allocation  of  resources  and  stimulates  research  and
development, innovation and investment.
...the Commission considers that, far from being the direct opposite of industrial policy, competition
policy is an essential instrument, with clear complementarity between the two policies”7  
In the EC Treaty there are two articles that is of big importance when it comes to EC Competition
Law. It is Article 81 and Article 82. Article 81 forbids collusions that may affect trade between
member states and has the object or effect of restricting competition within the common market.
This is the article that includes agreements between undertakings. Article 82 forbids the abusive
exploitation of a dominant position. Here sole conducts by firms are included. For this thesis Article
81 is the most relevant article even if Article 82 plays a role in licensing and will be discussed to
some extent.
2.3 Article 81
The base for Article 81 is to declare what is incompatible with the common market and therefore
forbidden. There are criteria that shall be fulfilled for Article 81 to be applicable. First there must be
some sort of collusion between undertakings, for instance an agreement. Secondly this collusion or
agreement shall possibly affect trade between member states in the EC. Thirdly the object or effect
of this agreement shall be to distort competition. These three criteria can be hard to interpret. It is
not always clear what an undertaking is or when something potentially affect trade.
“Undertaking” covers all collections of resources that carry out economic activity. It is a very broad
concept.
“Agreements” is much broader than just written agreements. Agreements that has not been signed
has  been  included  in  the  definition.  It  has  been  considered  enough  that  the  companies  have
implemented the regulations in the contract8. However, the exact scope of the term agreement will
not be very important in most cases. “Concerted practices” will cover much of what is not included
6 The 1993 Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: the Challenges and Ways Forward into
the 21st Century, COM(93) 700 
7 Annual Reports on Competition Policy, XXIIIrd Report 1993
8 Case 30/87 BP Kemi, [1988] E.C.R 2479, para. 18 
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in the concept of “agreement”. The concepts are fluid and overlap.9
The European Court  of  Justice  talked  about  the  distinction  between  agreements  and concerted
practices in “Dyestuffs”10 
“  the  object  is  to  bring  within  the  prohibition  of  that  article  a  form of  coordination  between
undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has
been  concluded,  knowingly  substitutes  practical  cooperation  between  them  for  the  risks  of
competition.“11 
“May affect trade between Member States” Even if an agreement only concerns the actions within
one Member State, this criteria may be fulfilled anyway. Trade is a broad concept and includes all
economic activities that relate to goods or services. The ECJ has, in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt12
concluded  that  some agreements  may be  subject  to  both  national  law and Community law.  In
Consten and Grundig v. Commission13 the ECJ made it clear that the important thing to consider:
“is whether the agreement  is  capable of constituting a threat,  either direct or indirect,  actual or
potential, to freedom of trade between member state in a manner which might harm the attainment
of the objectives of a single market between states.”14
A potential effect is thus enough, there is no need to prove an actual effect. The agreement might be
confined to a single member state and still  be judged to affect trade between member states. In
Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission15 the ECJ held that: 
“An agreement extending over the whole of the territory of a member state by its very nature has the
effect of reinforcing the compartmentalization of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the
economic inter  penetration which the treaty is  designed to bring about and protecting domestic
production.”16
9  Korah, Valentine, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, pg. 46
10 48, 49, 51-57/69, Imperial Chemichal Industries Ltd. and others v. Commisssion, [1972] E.C.R 619, appeal from
Dyestuff
11 48, 49, 51-57/69, Imperial Chemichal Industries Ltd. and others v. Commisssion, [1972] E.C.R 619, appeal from
Dyestuff, para. 64
12 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt,[1969] E.C.R 1
13 56 and 58/64, Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v Commission of the EEC, [1966] E.C.R 299
14 56 and 58/64, Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v Commission of the EEC, [1966] E.C.R 299
15 8/ 72, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities [1972] E.C.R. 977
16 8/ 72, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities, [1972] E.C.R. 977, para. 29
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To  fall  within  Article  81,  arrangements  must  have  “as  their  object  or  effect  the  prevention,
restriction  or  distortion  of  competition  within  the  common  market”17.  There  follows  a  list  of
examples that will be mentioned below, but this list is not exhaustive. The object does not really
have so much to do with the intentions of the parties. Even if the intentions were legitimate, the
steps that the parties take might go further than necessary and the agreement is caught anyway. 
The article lists examples of conduct that is assumed to be anti-competitive. These are:
• “directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
• limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
• share markets or sources of supply; 
• apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
• make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.”18
If one or several of these conditions are fulfilled, it is assumed that there is a prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition.
If the first part of Article 81 is fulfilled, the agreement is in conflict with European Competition
Law, and shall therefore be considered void. There is however a way for companies to uphold their
agreements. Article 81(3) EC states that paragraph one of Article 81 shall be declared inapplicable
if the agreement  contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical  or economic progress,  while  allowing consumers a  fair  share of the resulting benefit.
There  are  some  limitations  to  this  though.  The  agreement  is  not  allowed  to  impose  on  the
undertakings  concerned  restrictions  which  are  not  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  these
objectives or afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect  of a
substantial part of the products in question.
If the agreement is not compatible with Article 81 EC or falls  within any block exemption the
agreement is unenforceable. In addition, parties entering into such agreements risk fines as high as
10% of their worldwide turnover and claims for damages.19 
17 Article 81 EC Treaty
18 Article 81 EC Treaty
19 www.benelux.les-europe.org 
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2.4 Exemptions, Article 81(3)
Before 1 May 2004 the European Commission had exclusive competence to apply Article 81(3) EC
and to  grant  exemptions.  Parties  wishing to  obtain  an exemption  had to notify their  restrictive
agreements to the Commission. If the Commission was unwilling to grant an exemption, the parties
could enter into negotiations with the Commission concerning the required amendments to qualify
for  exemption.  This  system  was  rather  bureaucratic,  and  in  order  to  avoid  an  overload  of
notifications,  the  Commission  over  the  years  adopted  a  number  of  `block  exemptions',  e.g.
concerning vertical agreements (distribution agreements), horizontal agreements (i.e. co-operation
between  competitors),  etc.  Agreements  that  fulfilled  the  conditions  set  out  in  these  block
exemptions were automatically exempted and no longer required notification. 
As from 1 May 2004, the notification system has been abolished completely.20 One of the reasons
for this is the expansion of the European Union.21 Companies no longer have the possibility of
notifying  agreements  to  the  Commission  in  order  to  obtain  an  exemption.  The  Commission's
exclusive competence to grant an exemption has been abolished as well; the competition authorities
and the courts of the EU Member States can now also apply Article 81(3) EC. The parties them
selves have to carry out the analysis and assess whether their agreement restricts competition and if
so,  whether  it  is  possible  to  exempt  the  agreement  under  Article  81(3)  EC.  However,  if  the
agreement fulfills the conditions of one of the block exemptions then it will be automatically legally
valid and enforceable. If not, the parties might have to defend their agreement with arguments based
on Article 81(3) EC.22 
When the parties to an agreement shall assess if their clauses will be exempted under Article 81(3)
EC they shall look at whether the restrictions in the agreement makes it possible to perform the
activity in question more efficiently than it would have been if the restriction had not been in effect.
If a less restrictive arrangement would give the same positive effects, the restriction in question is
not allowed. 
The fact that consumers shall be able to get a fair share of the benefits implies that the consumers at
least  shall  be compensated for the negative effects  that  the agreement  might have.  This can of
course be achieved in many ways. For instance, if the consumers get an improved product it might
be allowed to have an increase in price due to the agreement.
20 www.benelux.les-europe.org  
21 www.martineau-jonson.co.uk  
22 www.benelux.les-europe.org  
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The last criteria in Article 81(3) EC has a connection to Article 82 EC, about dominant position. An
agreement may not give the parties the possibility to eliminate competition on the market. Settled
case law from the ECJ says that Article 81(3) can not prevent the application of Article 82 EC. 
2.5 Article 82  
Article  82 EC deals  with monopoly and market  power.  It focus  on undertakings which hold a
dominant position on the market. These undertakings behavior are somewhat constrained by the
competition rules. It is important to remember that Article 82 does not in any way prohibit the
holding of a dominant position, it is only the abuse of this position that is prohibited.
There are five essential elements that has to be established before the prohibitions of Article 82
applies:
• one or more undertakings
• a dominant position
• the dominant position must be held within the common market
• an abuse
• effect on inter-State trade
The two elements that is hardest to determine is whether the undertaking holds a dominant position
and if  there has been an abuse. The article does not  set  out  any procedure to declare when an
undertaking is dominant. This has to be determined with help from case law from the ECJ. What
has been considered important to the ECJ and also the the European Commission has been the
undertakings ability to act independently on the market23. The ECJ has set out a definition that has
been frequently used. The Court has held that an undertaking holds a dominant position “where it
can prevent effective competition being maintained by virtue of its ability to behave independently
of the usual Competitive constraints facing an entity operation on a market”.24
When it comes to determining what is an abuse there are some guidance in the article. What the
article takes as examples is:
• imposing unfair prices or unfair trading conditions
23 Re Continental Can Co inc [1972] JO L7/25, [1972] CMLR D11, para 3. In the appeal, Case 6/72, Europemballage
Corp and Continental Can Co inc v. Commission, [1973] ECR 215, [1973] CMLR 199, the ECJ did not comment on
the Commission's formulation of dominance, but it was approved by AG Romer and implicitly by the ECJ.
24 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 262
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• limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers
• applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
• tying,  meaning  that  the  dominant  company  makes  the  conclusion  of  contracts  subject  to
supplementary obligations that has no clear connection with the subject of the contracts
2.6 Relationship between Article 81 and 82 
Article 81 and 82 can be applied to the same contractual agreements. This was established by the
ECJ in  Hoffmann-La Roche25.  It must  be considered if  an agreement  concluded by a dominant
undertaking can benefit from a block exemption.  However, few block exemptions does not take
market shares into account. Therefore it is not common that a dominant undertaking can conclude
agreements that will be exempted on the basis of block exemptions. If an agreement should anyhow
fall under a block exemption the Commission has the possibility to withdraw the benefit of the
exemption in the particular case26. 
It is also important to take into account the individual application of Article 81 and 82 to the same
agreement. When the previous regulation was in force and the Commission had the possibility to
grant individual exemptions to companies under Article 81(3), it was not likely that exemptions
should be granted to dominant undertakings. As mentioned above, it is no longer possible to get
individual  exemptions  under  Article  81(3).  This  article  will  instead  be  considered  directly
applicable  by  national  courts  and  national  competition  authorities.  The  Commission  has  as  a
guidance issued an notice regarding the relationship between Article 81(3) and Article 8227. The
notice reiterates the position of case law, that the application of Article 81(3) does not prevent the
application of Article 82. It also makes it clear that Article 81(3) cannot be applied to permit an
abuse of a dominant position.28  
25 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] 3 CMLR 211
26 Regulation 1/2003 and provisions in particular block exemptions.
27 Commission's notice on the application of Article 81(3), [2004] OJ 101/97
28 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 292
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3. Introduction to Licensing in the Competition Perspective
3.1 What is Intellectual Property?
Intellectual  property  law gives  exclusive  rights  to  holders  of  patents,  copyright,  design  rights,
trademarks and other protected rights. Even if there is a recognized exclusive right of exploitation it
does not mean that intellectual property rights are immune from competition law. Both the systems
of competition law and intellectual property law have the same objective, promoting innovation and
efficient allocation of resources. Innovation is an important component of an open and competitive
market and intellectual property rights contribute to this by encouraging undertakings to invest in
developing new products and processes.29 It can also be said that licensing of intellectual property
opens up markets and allows third parties to exploit technologies that they would not have had
access to otherwise and therefore the licensing is not always anti-competitive.30
3.2 Commercial Considerations in Licensing
When  owning  an  intellectual  property  right  there  are  several  ways  to  benefit  from  the  right
commercially. One way for the owner is to exploit it himself but perhaps even more common is to
license the rights to others. There are several advantages of licensing:
• the owner has control over the way the right is used
• the owner can get continuing incomes from the exploitation  and can benefit  from the
licensees success
• the owner can sometimes exploit the right himself  
The licensor will normally be interested in maximizing the financial return and also keep control
over the licensed right. Therefore there are some provisions in many licensing agreements that may
give rise to competition law concerns. These provisions will be dealt with under Chapter 4, after the
TTBER has been discussed.31 
3.3 Development of licensing in relation to Article 81
The early attitude from the Commission was that even exclusive patent licenses did not fall within
Article  81(1)  EC as  long as  the  agreements  did  not  go beyond the  scope  of  the  patent.32 The
29 Korah, Valentine, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, pg. 17
30 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 703
31 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 698-699
32 Notice from the Commission, 24 Dec. 1962 [1962-3], JO 2922/62
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Commission's attitude changed later and moved towards a position where exclusive licenses, unless
de minimis, were within Article 81(1) EC and that many common non-territorial restraints were
outside the scope of the patent.
In 1972, the Commission took the view that any significant license other than a non-exclusive one
for the whole common market was caught by the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC. They concluded
that granting an exclusive license infringes Article 81 and requires an exemption. The ECJ have
however been of somewhat an other opinion. In the Maize Sees case33 the ECJ held that “an open
exclusive license” is not in itself contrary to Article 81(1) EC. A distinction has to be made between
an open exclusive license and absolute territorial protection. The meaning of an “open exclusive
license” is according to the ECJ, an agreement where: 
“... the exclusivitiy of the licence relates solely to the contractual relationship between the owner of
the right  and the licensee,  whereby the  owner merely undertakes  not  to  grant  other licences in
respect of the same territory and not to compete himself with the licensee on that territory” 34 
In Coditel II35 the ECJ ruled that even absolute territorial protection may not infringe Article 81(1)
EC in the light of the commercial practice in a particular industry. It has to be remembered that
these decisions were taken before the adoption of block exemptions for know-how.36     
In recent years EC authorities has demonstrated their capacity to regulate the exercise of intellectual
property rights. In Magill37 the Court of Justice confirmed that the European Commission has the
power to end an abusive refusal to license by imposing a compulsory copyright license.38There are
other cases where the ECJ has held that the competition rules in the EC Treaty can be used to
prevent IPR owners from using aggressive discounting and pricing schemes39or engage in product
bundling40.  This  development  has  by some  been  seen  as  tying  the  IPR owners  to  yet another
legislation41while some claim that IPR legislation and EC competition law should be viewed as of
equal weight and status under EC law. Some even argue that EC competition law should defer to
33 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] E.C.R 2015, paras
56-67
34 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] E.C.R 2015, paras
56-67, para. 53
35 262/81  Coditel SA, Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, and others v Ciné-Vog Films SA and
others, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, paras 15-20
36 Korah, Valentine, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, pg. 287
37 Case C-241-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] E.C.R I-743
38 Anderman, Steven D, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, pg.3
39 C-333/94 Tetra Pak / Commission [1996] E.C.R p.I-5951
40 C-333/94 Tetra Pak / Commission [1996] E.C.R p.I-5951 and C-53/92  Hilti / Commission [1994] E.C.R p.I-667
41 Anderman, Steven D, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, pg.3
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IPR legislation in the interest of innovation.42 
There  have  been  relatively  few  Court  decisions  on  licensing,  at  least  when  considering  the
importance licensing has in the commercial context. The reason for the lack of decisions from the
ECJ might first of all be that parties that earlier was granted an Article 81(3) exemption had little
incentive to challenge the decision. Secondly block exemptions have covered patent licenses since
1984 and later  also know-how licenses.  Therefore parties  have entered into  license agreements
covered by the block exemptions to a big extent.43 
3.4 How does EC Law create a balance between Competition Law and IPR's?
The structure of the EC Treaty and the interpretation of it has shaped a balance between competition
law and intellectual property rights. The EC Treaty provides in Article 2 that the Community shall
promote “a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities”. Article 3(g) requires the
institutions to ensure that competition in the internal market is not distorted. Articles 81 and 82 are
then set out as the main means of achieving these goal.44
42 Govaere, I, The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law
43 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 703
44 Anderman, Steven D, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, pg. 8
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3.5 Does IP and Competition Law have conflicting aims?
The  legal  monopoly  created  by  IP  laws  may  lead  to  significant  market  power  and  also  to  a
monopoly in the meaning of competition law. This may develop a conflict that often is mentioned in
doctrine, that competition law takes a away what IP law provides. This may to some extent be true
but  if  analyzed,  IP and competition  law complement  each other.  They both  promote  consumer
welfare and balance the rights of actors on the market. 
The aim of IP laws is to promote technical progress so that the consumers will benefit from this in
the end. To ensure this progress innovation must be ensured and the innovative efforts must be
promoted. There must however be a balance in the system and this balance is found by limited
rights for the innovators.  IP rights are often limited in time or in space and in many cases not
protected against parallel creations. Competition laws aims at promoting consumer welfare as well
but uses another method. By protecting competition, the driving force of efficient markets, it makes
sure that the best quality products are provided at the lowest possible price. This product market
competition will promote innovation and therefore it can be said that IP laws and competition laws
complement each other, rather than stand in conflict.45 
3.6 How to assess if a license agreement limits competition?
When assessing if an license agreement restricts competition the starting point has to be to look at
the competitive conditions that would have been at hand it the agreement had not existed. Then it
has to be assessed what effect the agreement might have on this situation. The competition between
companies  using the same technologies and the competition between companies  using different
technologies will be of interest. If the competition might be limited due to the entire agreement or
due to some specific restrictions in the agreement it is possible that the agreement is covered by
Article 81(1) EC.
3.7 What negative effects can license agreements have on the market?
Technology  transfer  agreements  can  have  negative  effects  on  the  market,  even  if  sharing  of
technology often is positive. The European Commission has pointed out some important negative
effects that may occur when licensing:
45 Pepperkorn, L, “IP Licenses and Competition Rules: Striking the Right Balance” (2003) 26 World Competition 527
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• inter-technology competition between companies on the same technology market may reduced,
including facilitation of collusion. 
• competitors may be foreclosed from the market since their costs increase and they have problems
getting access to essential input.
• inter-technology competition between competitors that produce products on the basis of the same
technology may be reduced.46
If  companies  that  produce  products  based  on  substitutable  technologies  transfer  technologies
between each other and include reciprocal obligations to provide each other with improvements, it
will  be impossible  for  one of them to gain technological  lead over the other.  This will  give a
negative impact on competition, since no one will have the incentive to work towards new solutions
that will benefit the consumers.
The risk of collusion is  something that  can increase when competitors license from each other.
License agreements may lead to increased transparency on the market and raised entry barriers. The
higher degree of commonality that license agreements may lead to is another factor that affects the
risk of collusion. When companies license between each other, they often have about the same costs
for the production of the products and this gives them a similar view on the terms of coordination.  
The entry barrier for competitors may be raised due to licensing agreements. These entry barriers
may consist of restrictions on some licensees on the market to license to new actors. There may also
be agreements that does not prevent the licensees from entering into these types of agreements but
that may create incentives for them not to. For instance, third parties may be unable to enter the
market since licensors have imposed non-competition clauses on their licensees. This leads to an
insufficient  number  of  licensees  remaining  on  the  market  where  a  third  party  wants  to  enter.
Competitors that have substitute technologies may have difficulties entering the market due to tying
that some licensors are able create. If a licensee wants to license one part of a technology he might
have to license a package of all parts of the technology. This reduces his incentive to look for other
parts of the technology on other parts of the market. Tying is a problem not only in the area of
technology transfer and there are several regulations concerning this.   
3.8 What positive effects can restrictive license agreements have on the market?  
There are some pro-competitive effects of licensing that normally can be seen on the market. A
46 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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license generally increase overall competition since a new actor enters the market.47 Licensing of
technology  may  also  often  promote  the  integration  of  complimentary  factors  of  production,
sometimes referred to as “efficiency enhancing integration of economic activity”48. This will benefit
consumers since it reduces costs and also promotes the introduction of new products. In some cases,
restrictive  license  agreements  may  produce  such  positive  effects  that  the  negative  effects  are
outweighed. To assess if  this  is  the case,  Article  81(3)  EC shall  be used.  This  article  contains
exceptions from Article 81(1) EC. For an agreement to be exempted through Article 81(3) EC it has
to produce economic benefits,  the restriction of competition must be indispensable to attain the
efficiencies  and  the  consumers  must  receive  a  fair  share  of  the  efficiency  gains.  Licensing
agreements often increase efficiency because they bring together technologies and allow companies
to create new and improved products. This often leads to lower production costs and most likely
lower costs for the consumers. Licensor's often license technology to other companies because it is
more efficient to do so than to exploit it  himself. The licensee might already have access to the
necessary equipment for the production. When the licensee gets access to the licensor's technology
he is able to combine it with his own resources and exploit the technology in a efficient way. In
some  cases  a  combination  of  the  licensor's  and  the  licensees  technologies  may give  rise  to  a
synergies and one plus one might become three. Some license agreements give a more effective
distribution system and this can lead to saved costs and perhaps also less environmental affect. The
pooling of technologies to create licensing packages may also create beneficial effects. If a third
party needs several technologies his transaction costs may be lowered if he only has to license from
one place instead of contacting each licensee.49 
47 Lohmann,  N,  “The  new Technology Transfer  Regulation  240/96  –  prevailing  controversies  at  the  intellectual
property right/competition law interface”, pg. 32 
48 Romano Subiotto,  Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton, Brussles,  Technology Licensing: The EC & US Rules
Compared, (conference paper), 1995
49 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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4. Software and its regulations
When software is licensed the situation will often be different from other licensing, for example
licensing of a patented technology. Therefore it can create problems when software is treaded as
other technology. The usual way of looking at technology that can fall within the TTBER is that a
company  license  a  technical  solution  from  someone  and  the  licensee  uses  the  technology for
production or for incorporation in his own products. This has been the agreements that the earlier
block exemptions on the area has been constructed for. However, when it comes to software, the
licensee might not at all be the “normal” licensee. He may be the end user of the product and in
many cases even a private consumer. The private consumer issue will however not fall within the
TTBER  since  the  agreements  have  to  be  between  undertakings  to  be  covered  by  that  block
exemption.
4.1 The Software Directive
Computer  programs  are  not  exactly  comparable  to  other  technology  or  copyrighted  work.
Technology that is licensed under the TTBER are often protected by patents but software is not to
the same extent. The European Commission has issued a specific directive about software50. This
directive  is  interesting  for  anyone is  in  the  software  business.  The  directive  defines  computer
programs as all sorts of programs, including such that is incorporated in hardware. It also includes
preparatory design  materials  that  leads  to  the  development  of  a  computer  program,  under  the
condition that the preparatory work can result in a computer program in a later stage. The directive
does not require any qualitative or aesthetic feature. A computer program will fill the demands for
protection is it is original and not copied from somewhere else. 
Article 4 of the Directive specifies what the rightholder shall be allowed to do or authorize. It is the
rightholder  that  has the  exclusive  right  to  reproduce the computer  program, to translate,  adapt,
arrange or alter the program and to distribute the original or copies of the program.
Article 5 and 6 of the Directive limits the rights of the rightholder. These limitations are important
for the use of computer programs. Article 5 gives the lawful acquirer the right to use the program in
a way that makes it  possible for him to take advantages of the program in accordance with its
intended purpose.  It is  also allowed to make back up copies unless  it  can be considered to be
necessary to  prevent  this.  Finally Article  5  allows  the  rightful  user  of  a  computer  program to
observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas behind the
50 Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42 “The Software directive”
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program. This is  allowed if it  is  done as a part  of loading,  displaying, running, transmitting or
storing the program.   
Article 6 regulates the right to decompiling. The rightholder has the right to forbid decompiling to a
certain  extent.  However,  decompiling shall  be allowed if  it  is  necessary to  be  able  to  achieve
interoperability of independently created computer programs.51
Even  if  the  Directive  cannot  actually  effect  the  application  of  the  competition  rules  it  may
reasonably be assumed that  any clause  in  a  licensing agreement  safeguarding the  rights  in  the
Directive will not fall foul of Article 81(1) EC unless it contradicts the exceptions in Articles 5 and
6 of the Directive.52 
4.2 What regulations are important?
The situation when one undertaking licenses software from another is from the 1st of May 2004
covered by the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation. This has changed the playing
field somewhat and given the software industry a legal framework similar to the one that other
technical fields has had before. Software was included to some extent even in the previous TTBERs
but not as a sole license object. It had to be part of another technology to be covered. Now we have
a more coherent regulation. The same rules apply to the same type of situations regardless of if it
has to do with patents, know-how or software. 
Even if software now has been included in the TTBER, the Software Directive is still applicable.
These two regulations have to function together and that should not create problems in most cases.
As mentioned above the Directive can not influence the application of the competition rules. What
however might be new is that both regulations, the TTBER and the Software Directive has to be
observed. A clause permitted by the Software Directive could,  theoretically be in breach of the
TTBER.
There will be other regulations that in some cases can be of importance to companies licensing
software. For more information about this, see chapter 5.10.
51 Jerner, Magdalena, Licensavtal för datorprogram, pg. 40
52 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 761
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5. Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
In  1965  the  European  Commission  got  the  power  to  make  regulations  that  exempt  classes  of
agreements  from  Article  81(1)  EC.  These  regulations  are  normally  called  group  or  block
exemptions.  The Commission issue these exemptions to create some legal certainty since many
companies might have problems with determining the effect the competition rules might have to
their agreements.  These group exemptions create “safe harbors”. If agreements fall within the group
exemptions the companies know what they are allowed to agree upon without risking to fall foul to
competition regulations. 
5.1 The old TTBER's
The first block exemption in the field of IP licensing came 1984 and applied to pure patent licenses
and to mixed patent and know-how licenses where the patent was the biggest element. 1989 came a
block exemption that applied to pure know-how licensing agreements and to mixed know-how and
patent licensing agreements where know-how was the biggest element. These regulations were very
similar but they contained some differences. 1996 they were replaced with a single block exemption
covering all situations that had been covered in the two earlier exemptions. This regulation, 240/96
on technology transfer agreements stayed in force until the new one, that came into force in May
2004 was finished.53
The TTBER from 1996 did not include copyright or trademark licensing. The only way a copyright
license  could  be  covered  by the  old  TTBER was  if  the  copyrighted  material  was  ancillary to
qualifying technologies. Pure software or copyright licenses did clearly not qualify. In the older
TTBER there were lists over provisions that were considered to rarely infringe Article 81(1) EC and
provision that were considered to be restrictive of competition and therefore were forbidden.54 The
later were on the so called “black list” and the ones that were considered not to infringe were on the
“white list”.
5.2 The Commissions motive for change
The reforms of the EC Competition rules in the fields of vertical and horizontal agreements has
made it clear that a shift from a legalistic and form-based approach to a more economic and effect-
based approach is taking place. This puts focus more on the analysis of possible efficiencies of
certain restrictions. These reforms effect IPR's as much as it effects other areas. The old TTBER
53 Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 711
54 Korah, Valentine, “An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice”, pg. 297
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was  rather  formalistic  and  therefore  a  change  was  needed  to  adapt  to  the  changes  in  the  EC
Competition rules.55 
Enhancing clarity and coherence. To make the TTBE rules simpler, clearer and more coherent has
been one of the Commission's aims with the change -- an aim which third party submissions on the
Evaluation Report unanimously support.
In line with those aims, the Commission has stated what the objectives of the reform was:
(i) to encourage the dissemination of technical knowledge in the Community;
(ii) to generate effective competition and technical progress; and 
(iii) to create a favorable legal environment for investments. 56
Covering a wider range of IP. Coverage of software licensing agreements appears to have been
widely supported by submissions to the Commission.  Opinions diverge as to whether the scope
should have been extended more generally to cover all IPRs, in particular copyright, trademarks and
design rights. Some emphasize that this would increase legal certainty (as the applicable principles
would be the same for all or most IPRs), and remove the difficulty in assessing whether for example
copyright is really ancillary to patent or know-how licensing agreements (and therefore covered by
the current  TTBE).  On the  other  hand,  a  number of submissions  stress  that  the different  IPRs
involve different competition law concerns that should not be lumped together.57
Envisaging an "economics-based"  approach.  The Commission questioned the rationale of some
policy determinations taken in the old TTBE and found that they needed updating. As is the case
with vertical and horizontal restraints, the new TTBER takes a move from a legalistic into a more
"economics-based" approach, focusing on the competitive relationship between the parties,  their
market share and the nature of the restriction concerning IP rights.58 
5.3 The new TTBER from 2004
The new TTBER and the Guidelines from the Commission shall be considered as a whole. The
Guidelines are important for three reasons. Firstly, they create a framework of general principles
that  concerns  the  application  of  Article  81  EC  and  intellectual  property  rights.  Secondly,  the
Guidelines explain how the TTBER shall be applied. Thirdly, they explain how to apply Article 81
55 Commission Evaluation Report on the transfer of Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation N. 240/96
56 Bulletin by John Ratliff and Michael Goldmann, www.wilmer.com
57 Bulletin by John Ratliff and Michael Goldmann, www.wilmer.com
58 Bulletin by John Ratliff and Michael Goldmann, www.wilmer.com
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(1) and 81(3) EC to agreements that fall outside the scope of the TTBER. 
When an agreement falls within the TTBER it will benefit from the exemptions that are set out in
Article 2 of the Regulation. This means that Article 81 EC shall not apply to these agreements. The
agreement is deemed not to be anti-competitive. The parties gain legal certainty that the agreement
that they enter into will be valid. What has to be kept in mind is that even if an agreement falls
within the TTBER the European Commission or the competition authorities in a Member State can
withdraw the benefits of the block exemption.
However, if an agreement falls outside the TTBER there is no presumption that the agreement is
anti-competitive. The parties them selves will have to assess if their agreement fall foul of Article
81 or not.
5.4 Concept of Technology Transfer Agreements - Definitions
The concept of technology transfer agreements means, according to TTBER Article 1(1)(b), know-
how licensing agreements, patent licensing agreements, software copyright licensing agreements, or
a  mix  of  these  agreements.59 The  Commission  has  in  its  Draft  Commission  Notice  specified
“technology” as covering patents and patent applications, utility models and applications for utility
models,  design rights, software copyright, know-how and other similar  IP rights60.  The scope is
broader than the old TTBER of 1996, which did not cover software.
To be considered a “transfer” the technology has to flow from one undertaking to another. This is
normally done  by a  licensing agreement which gives  the  licensee the right  to  use the licensed
technology and in return pay licensee fees. The transfer can also take the form of a sublicensing, in
which case the licensee licenses the technology to a third party with the consent of the original
licensor.61  
Trademarks and copyright licensing are covered only if  they are licensed as ancillary to patent,
know-how  or  software  copyright  license  agreements.62 The  licensor  can  for  instance  give  the
licensee  the  right  to  use  the  licensor's  trademark  on  the  products  produced  under  the  license
agreement and in such case the TTBER will cover the trademark license. If however the licensee
59 Commission Regulation (EC) no 772/2004
60 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, pg.46
61 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, pg.48
62 www.benelux.les-europe.org
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has little  use of the  licensed technology and the main purpose of the  agreement  is  to  give the
licensee access to the trademark, this agreement will fall outside of the TTBER.63 
5.5 Scope and duration of the TTBER
The TTBER does only cover agreements between two undertakings. This excludes i.e. patent pools.
These kind of agreements will, according to the Commission, be treated as if they were covered by
the block exemption if it all other parts fulfill the requirements herein.64
From Article 2 of the TTBER, it follows that for an license agreement to be covered by the TTBER,
it must be “for the manufacture or provision of contract products” i.e. products incorporating or
produced with the licensed technology. Regular subcontracting agreements are not covered by the
TTBER unless they go beyond simple outsourcing. If a subcontracting agreement reduces the ability
or incentive for the subcontractor to innovate, competition concerns may arise.
The TTBER applies for as long as the licensed property right has not expired or been declared
invalid, or in the case of know-how, the know-how is secret.
5.6 Market definition and market shares
To determine whether  an  agreement  or  other similar  behavior  falls  within the  TTBER,  market
shares are of great importance. To determine the market shares, one has to know what the relevant
market is.
The TTBER uses market definitions when assessing the competitive effects of license agreements.
Two markets  must  be defined, the relevant  goods and service market  (product market)  and the
technology market.  The  product  market  is  defined in  Article  3  of  the  TTBER.  It  refers  to  the
relevant goods and service markets in both their geographic and product dimension. The technology
market consist of the licensed technology and its substitutes. Substitutes is defined from a customer
perspective. If a customer could use another technology as a substitute, it  falls within the same
technology market. Once the market definition is made, the market shares can be assessed.
In relation to the technology market, the market share shall be calculated on the basis of the sales of
the licensor and all his licensees of products incorporating the licensed technology and this for each
63 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, pg.50
64 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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relevant market separately. All sales are taken into account. 
The market shares on the product market “is to be calculated on the basis of the licensee's sales of
products incorporating the licensor's technology and competing products, i.e. the total sales of the
licensee on the product market in question”.65
5.7 Competitors or non-competitors
Agreement  between  competitors  normally  pose  a  greater  risk  to  competition  than  agreements
between non-competitors. If it shall be possible to determine the competitive relationship between
two or  several  undertakings,  it  must  be  examined if  they should  have been actual  or  potential
competitors  if  the  agreement  about  licensing  had  not  existed.  Companies  are  seen  as  actual
competitors  if  they are active on the same product  or technical  market  without  infringing each
others intellectual property rights. Actors are seen as potential competitors on a product market if
they, without the license agreement and without infringing each others rights, would have invested
further to penetrate the market as a responds to a small but permanent increase in product price. As
potential competitors on a technical market, are companies that have exchangeable technologies.
5.8 Hardcore Restrictions
The TTBER has some hardcore restrictions that are forbidden to have in any agreement. A hardcore
restriction  included  in  an  agreement  will  make  the  whole  agreement  fall  outside  the  block
exemption. When something is classified as a hardcore restriction, it is because it is almost always
considered to be anti-competitive. 
Article 4 of the TTBER makes some differences between competitors and non-competitors when it
comes to the hardcore restrictions.
Agreements between competing undertakings
Article 4(1) covers the hardcore restrictions for licensing between competitors. The TTBER will not
cover agreements that have as their object:
 (a) the restriction of a party's ability to determine its prices when selling products to third parties
 (b) the limitation of output, except limitations on the output of contract products imposed on the licensee in a
non-reciprocal agreement or imposed on only one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement;
65 Draft  Commission Notice,  Guidelines on the application of Article  81  of  the EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, 2004/C 101/02, para. 71 
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 (c) the allocation of markets or customers except:
(i)  the obligation on the licensee(s) to produce  with the licensed  technology only within one or  more
technical fields of use or one or more product markets,
     (ii) the obligation on the licensor and/or the licensee, in a non-reciprocal agreement, not to produce with the
licensed technology within one or more technical fields of use or one or more product markets or one or more
exclusive territories reserved for the other party,
     (iii) the obligation on the licensor not to license the technology to another licensee in a particular territory,
(iv) the restriction, in a non-reciprocal agreement, of active and/or passive sales by the licensee and/or the
licensor into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive customer group reserved for the other party,
     (v) the restriction, in a non-reciprocal agreement, of active sales by the licensee into the exclusive territory
or to the exclusive customer group allocated by the licensor to another licensee provided the latter was not a
competing undertaking of the licensor at the time of the conclusion of its own licence,
    (vi) the obligation on the licensee to produce the contract products only for its own use provided that the
licensee is not restricted in selling the contract  products  actively and passively as spare parts for its own
products,
     (vii) the obligation on the licensee, in a non-reciprocal agreement, to produce the contract products
only for a particular customer, where the license was granted in order to create an alternative source of supply
for that customer
(d) the restriction of the licensee's ability to exploit his own technology or the restriction of the ability of the
parties to carry out research and development, unless this is necessary to protect the licensed know-how of
third parties.
I will give a short explanation to the hardcore restrictions to make it somewhat clearer what they
mean.
Article 4(1)(a) – Price restrictions
According to the guidelines this restriction concerns agreements that “has as their object the fixing
of prices”. The price fixing can take the form of fixed, maximum or recommended prices. This
differs from the price fixing restriction between non-competitors which I will discuss below. Even
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things that just indirectly can be seen as price fixing, such as disincentives to diverge from a certain
price level, will be caught by this hardcore restriction.66 
Article 4(1)(b) – Output limitations
This type of restriction limits how much a party may produce and sell. Also here are terms that give
the parties less incentive to produce more than a certain amount caught by the article.67
Article 4(1)(c) – Market or consumer allocations
Agreements where competitors share markets or consumers are seen as having as their object to
restrict competition and are therefore forbidden. This article is however subject  to a number of
important exceptions. If a clause in an agreement falls within one of these exceptions the parties can
uphold the clause without risking to fall outside the TTBER.68
Article 4(1)(c)(i)
A field of use or a product market restriction can be used in reciprocal and non-reciprocal
agreements. This exception means that it is allowed to give a license in order for the licensee
to  do  one  or  more  specific  things  with  it.  It  is  important  that  these  restrictions  are
distinguished from territory or consumer restrictions. 69
Article 4(1)(c)(ii)
Only in non-reciprocal agreements the licensor and/or the licensee can agree not to produce
within one or more fields of use, product markets or exclusive territories. This only relates to
producing, not to sales.70
Article 4(1)(c)(iii)
This provision allows for the grant of a sole license and can protect the licensee from other
licensees producing the same product. This exception applies to both reciprocal and non-
reciprocal  agreements.  However,  it  is  not  allowed to  let  the  exception  affect  the  parties
ability to exploit their own technology in the respective territories. 71
Article 4(1)(c)(iv)
This exception makes it possible for the parties to a non-reciprocal agreement to exclude
each other from making both active or passive sales into exclusive territories or to consumer
groups allocated to the other party. 72
66 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
67 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
68 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
69 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
70 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
71 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
72 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.731
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Article 4(1)(c)(v)
In a non-reciprocal agreement the licensee can be prevented from conducting active sales
(not passive) into territories or to consumer groups that are exclusively reserved to another
licensee. This so long as that other licensee was not a competitor to the licensor when the
license  was  given.  However,  if  the  licensees  themselves  among each  other  agree  about
restrictions in sales into certain territories, this will qualify as a cartel and is not covered by
the TTBER.  73
Article 4(1)(c)(vi)
This  exception  will  be  applicable  in  a  situation  where  the  licensee  needs  the  license  to
produce products for his own use, for instance to incorporate them in his own machines. The
licensor can ban the licensee from selling products to other actors on the market. However,
the license shall be allowed to sell the licensed product as spare parts to his products. This
type pf restrictions are called “captive use restrictions”.74 
Article 4(1)(c)(vii)
The licensor is allowed to limit who the licensee produces the licensed products for. These
type of agreements are often called “second source” and the whole point of the agreements
are to provide a particular customer with an alternative way of buying the licensed product.
The licensee is banned from selling the product to someone else than that specific customer.
Several  licensees can get licenses to sell  to the same customer,  so that  there are several
sources for the particular customer to turn to.75
Article 4(1)(d) – Limitations on technology exploitation or R&D
The license agreement can not prevent the licensee from exploiting his own technology or restrict
any of the parties from conducting R&D unless it is necessary to prevent the licensed know-how
from  being  disclosed  to  third  parties.  If  a  restriction  is  included  for  this  matter  it  must  be
proportionate and necessary. This is applicable in both reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements.76
Agreements between non-competing undertakings
Article 4(2) of the TTBER lists the hardcore restrictions for non-competitors. These are somewhat
similar  to  the  ones  between  competitors  but  there  are  differences.  When  the  parties  are  non-
competitors  the  hardcore  restrictions  are  not  as  restrictive  as  they  are  for  competitors.  If  an
agreement between non-competitors shall be covered by the TTBER, it is not allowed to have as its
73 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
74 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
75 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
76 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
32
Licensing in the perspective of EC Competition Law                                                                   Camilla Johansson
object:
 (a)  the restriction of a party's ability to determine its  prices  when selling products  to third  parties,  without
prejudice to the possibility of imposing a maximum sale price or recommending a sale price, provided that it does
not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or  incentives offered by, any of the
parties;
 (b) the restriction of the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, the licensee may passively sell the
contract products, except:
(i) the restriction of passive sales into an exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group reserved for
the licensor,
(ii) the restriction of passive sales into an exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group allocated by
the licensor to another licensee during the first two years that this other licensee is selling the contract
products in that territory or to that customer group,
        (iii) the obligation to produce the contract products only for its own use provided that the licensee is not  
restricted in selling the contract products actively and passively as spare parts for its own products,
     
        (iv) the obligation to produce the contract products only for a particular customer, where the license was 
granted in order to create an alternative source of supply for that customer,
      
(v) the restriction of sales to end-users by a licensee operating at the wholesale level of trade,
     (vi) the restriction of sales to unauthorized distributors by the members of a selective distribution system;
(c) the restriction of active or passive sales to end-users by a licensee which is a member of a selective distribution
system and which operates at the retail level, without prejudice to the possibility of prohibiting a member of
the system from operating out of an unauthorized place of establishment.
Article 4(2)(a) – Price Restrictions
The prohibition of resale price maintenance between non-competitors does not cover maximum or
recommended  prices.  However,  these  type of  price  recommendations  will  be  forbidden if  they
actually amount to fixed or minimum prices due to pressure from, or incentives by, the other party.77
77 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
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Article 4(2)(b) – Passive sales restrictions imposed on the licensee
The licensor may not impose restrictions on the licensee that limits his ability to conduct passive
sales into specific territory's or to specific consumer groups. This restriction will include conditions
that create disincentives for the licensee to conduct unsolicited sales. It is important to notice that
this article dose not limit the parties from including sales restrictions on the licensor or active sales
restrictions on the licensee. This passive sales ban in Article 4(2)(b) does however come with a
number of major exceptions. 78
Article 4(2)(b)(i)
The licensor may reserve territory's or customer groups to himself without being caught by
the hardcore restrictions.  It is  important  for the licensor to have this  possibility since he
might not be willing to license the technology otherwise.79
Article 4(2)(b)(ii)
The  licensor  may also  reserve  territory's  or  costumer  groups  to  other  licensees.  This  is
however only allowed for the first two years that the other licensee is serving the reserved
territory or consumer group. To include a restriction like this in agreements may be necessary
to convince the first  licensee to take the license. Without  such a restriction this  licensee
might not be able to recoup his investments.80
Article 4(2)(b)(iii)
This captive use restriction has the same meaning here as it has for competitors. A licensor
can prevent the licensee from selling products produced under the license except as spare
parts to his own products.81
Article 4(2)(b)(iv)
This  second  source  provision  allows  the  licensor  to  limit  what  customers  the  licensee
produces the licensed product  for.  This is done to give the customer a second source of
supply. The restriction is the same as in the hardcore competitors list.82
Article 4(2)(b)(v)
This  exemption  allows the  licensor  to  incorporate restrictions  in  the agreement  that  will
maintain the distinction between wholesale level and retail trade level. The licensor can give
a wholesale function to a licensee and prevent him from selling to end customers.83
78 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.732
79 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
80 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
81 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
82 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
83 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
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 Article 4(2)(b)(vi)
This restriction makes it possible to uphold an integrity in a selective distribution system.
The license agreement may contain restrictions that prohibits the licensees from selling to
unauthorized distributors. 84    
Article 4(2)(c) – Active or passive sales ban to end users within selective distribution systems
If a licensee is at the retail level of a selective distribution system he cannot be prevented from
active or  passive selling to  any end-users.  It  is  only at  the  wholesale level  that  these  types of
restrictions are allowed, as mentioned above. 85
5.9 Excluded restrictions
There are some types of restrictions  that  are  not  block exempted through the TTBER. If these
conditions are included in an agreement, it does not prevent the entire agreement form falling within
the TTBER. It is only the specific restriction in question that is not block exempted. This means that
this restriction has to be individually assessed to see if it is in compliance with EC Competition
Law. In Article 5(1) of the TTBER three conditions are set up. The purpose of these is to avoid that
the licensees incentive to innovate is reduced. The excluded restrictions in Article 5 of the TTBER
are:
Article 5(1)(a)
The licensee must not be obliged to grant an exclusive license to the licensor in respect of its
own  severable  improvements  or  new  applications  of  the  licensed  technology.  If  an
improvement shall be considered to be severable, it shall be possible to exploit it without
infringing the licensed technology or without using licensed know-how.
Article 5(1)(b)
The licensee must not be obliged to assign improvements or new applications to the licensor.
It shall be observed that Article 5 does not cover non-exclusive grant back provisions even if
they are non-reciprocal. This means that the licensor can request the licensee to grant him a
non-exclusive license but the licensor himself does not have to grant the licensee any license
to improvements made by the licensor.
Article 5(1)(c)
The licensee may not be prevented from challenging the validity of any of the licensor's
84 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
85 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg.733
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intellectual  property  rights.  The  restriction  to  challenge  the  validity  of  the  licensor's
technology, is important to uphold undistorted competition and the underlying principles of
intellectual property. It is often the licensee that is in the best position to determine if the
intellectual property of the licensor is valid or not. Normally, the licensee has a lot more
knowledge about the technology than other competitors. If an invalid intellectual property is
upheld it stifles innovation. Therefore it is important for the competitive market to eliminate
invalid  intellectual  property.  The  restriction  has  one  advantage  for  the  licensor.  If  the
licensee  challenges  the  validity of  the  licensed  technology, the  licensor  has  the  right  to
terminate the license agreement.  This is because the licensor should not be obliged to deal
with a party that is trying to challenge the subject matter of the agreement that the parties
have entered into. This regulation can be said to put the risk of challenging on the licensee.
He may lose his license if he challenges the validity of the intellectual property. 86
Article 5(2) 
This  article  does  only  apply  to  agreements  between  non-competitors  and  the  content  of  the
provisions are the same as the content of Article 4(1)(d), the hardcore restriction in agreements
between competitors. This means that the licensee can not be prevented from exploiting his own
technology or be limited in his ability to carry out research and development.  
5.10 Practical issues
There are several conditions and restrains that are common in licensing agreements and I will try to
give a overview over some of them and how they might be applied in respect of Article 81 EC and
the TTBER. I will  give a short  description of how certain restrictions can be found to be anti-
competitive but also when they can be pro-competitive.
There are several reasons that the licensor might want restrictions in the license agreement. It can be
necessary to safeguard confidential information, ensuring quality control, limiting what the licensee
can do with the technology and provide clauses for termination of the agreement. The licensee will
also have somewhat the same concerns as the licensor. but from the other side. If the restrictions can
be enforced or not will to a large extent depend on competition law.87
Royalty obligations
Royalties  can  normally  be  determined  in  the  way  the  parties  find  appropriate  without  being
86 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, p.107-114
87 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 699
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restricted by Article 81 EC. A licensor may apply different royalties to different licensees without it
being in conflict with EC Competition Law. The parties may also extend the royalty obligation
beyond the duration of the licensed intellectual property right. However, in a situation with cross-
licensing between competitors some royalty obligations may lead to price fixing and than there is a
hardcore restriction in the TTBER covering this.88 In Coditel I89 the ECJ made it clear that the right
holder may determine the royalty depending on the extent of the use. In these cases the fee shall be
proportional90.
Exclusive licensing and sales restrictions
An  exclusive  license  is  a  license  where  the  licensor  undertakes  not  to  license  the  concerned
technology to a third party. There might be limitations to the license. The licensor might undertake
not license the technology to another licensee in a particular territory or in respect of a particular
customer group. These type of licenses as such does not imply that the licensor or other licensees
are restricted in their production or sales. Exclusive licensing may even be good for the efficiencies
on the market.  If an undertaking gets exclusivity they may be able to  invest  more quickly and
promote the technology in a way that they would not have done if they had not had exclusivity.
However, there are some problems that has to be considered when looking at exclusive licensing. A
distinction between competitors and non-competitors have to be made.91 
Exclusive licensing between competitors are block exempted up to the market share threshold of 20
%. Above this the agreement may be caught by Article 81(1) EC. The most important factors to
consider in this case is the market power of the licensee and if the entry into the specific market is
difficult. Between competitors the restriction on the licensor that is included in the exclusive license
may have as its main object to foreclose other potential licensees. This limits other actors access to
the market and may also restrict inter-technology competition. If two competitors grant each other
exclusive licenses there is a risk not only for foreclosure of other actors but a risk for a reduced
inter-technological competition. If there was no exclusive license, the parties could license to other
actors as well and this could give new competition on the market.92  
Between non-competitors, exclusive licensing is block exempted up to a market share threshold of
88 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements 
89 62/79 S.A Compagnie Generale pour la diffusion de la Television, Coditel and others v. S.A Cine Vog Films and
others [1980] E.C.R 881
90 Moritz, Hans-Werner, “EC Competition Law aspects and Software Licensing, part II, pg. 518
91 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
92 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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30 %. Above this limit, there is a risk for foreclosure if there is a limited amount of technologies
available on the market. This effect becomes more serious if several licensors exclusively license
different technologies to the same licensee. This may also lead to collusion between licensors that
are active on the same market. However, as mentioned regarding competitors, exclusivity may give
benefits, such as bigger investments and faster market penetration.93
Exclusive  licenses  are  often  combined  with  sales  restrictions.  Also  here  a  distinction  between
competitors and non-competitors have to be made. If an agreement between competitors include a
sales restriction it is a hardcore restriction under Article 4(1)(c) TTBER. There are however some
exceptions to these regulations and the exceptions are what differs between competitors and non-
competitors. These hardcore restrictions are dealt with in the section about the different clauses in
the TTBER.94
Output restrictions
Output restrictions are dealt with in 4(1)(b) TTBER when it comes to competitors. This article does
not cover non-reciprocal output restrictions imposed on the licensee. That kind of restrictions are
excluded  from  the  block  exemption  by  Article  5(2)  TTBER.  Output  restrictions  may  limit
competition if the licensee has a relatively big market share and where the total output is limited.
There are also risks that output limitations in a licensing agreement will limit the intra-technology
between  competing  licensees.  In  some  cases  these  kind  of  restrictions  might  also  lead  to  a
strengthened partitioning of the market and/or extended territorial protection. As with many other
restrictions, output restrictions can be pro-competitive. The licensor may have an interest in limiting
the output of products that incorporate his technology. If this  was not  possible, many licensing
agreement might not be concluded.95
Field of use restrictions
These kind of restrictions limits the licensees use of the licensed technology. A distinction has to be
made between actual field of use restrictions and customer restrictions, that are covered by Article 4
(1)(b) and (c). The decisive factor is if the products that incorporate the licensed technology belongs
to separate product markets. Having field of use restrictions in agreements between non-competitors
will give the licensor the opportunity to reserve one or more product markets. This does generally
not restrict competition. They can actually promote competition by giving the licensor the incentive
93 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
94 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
95 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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to license to several licensees and thereby spread the technology. Restrictions of field of use in
agreements between competitors are block exempted up to a threshold if 20 %.  The most important
competitive restriction that may occur when using this kind of restriction is the risk that the licensee
ceases to be competitive within the restricted area. 96
Captive use restrictions 
This kind of restriction can be described as a restriction limiting the licensee to producing products
in such quantities that only fills his own need for production and repair. These type of restrictions
are  block  exempted  up  to  20  %  and  30  %  depending  on  if  it  concerns  agreements  between
competitors or non-competitors. If the parties to the agreement has market share thresholds above
these market shares, it has to be examined what effects the restriction has. 97
When there is a captive use restriction in an agreement between non-competitors there are two main
risks  to  competition.  First  there  is  a  risk for  restriction  of  intra-technology competition  on the
market for the supply of inputs. Secondly, there could be an exclusion of arbitrage between the
licensees and this could give the licensor the possibility to impose discriminatory conditions. 
In situations when the parties are competitors it has to be determined if the licensee was a supplier
to third parties prior to the license agreement. If he was, there may be some serious market effects. It
may lead to a market sharing, especially if there is a reciprocal restraint. If a restraint like this would
be combined with a limitation of the licensees own technology, it would be a hardcore restriction
according to Article 4(1)(c) of the TTBER.98
These type of restraints may, as so many other promote competition. In some cases the licensor
might feel a need for having captive use restrictions so that he can spread the technology.
Tying
Tying in technology license agreements are often requiring that the licensee shall license another
technology as well  and not  only the  first  technology that  the licensee was interested in.  If the
products are not distinct, there is no tying. Distinctiveness depends on if the technologies belong to
different markets. If the licensed product can not be exploited without the second, tied product there
is  not  a  case  of  tying.  If  the  parties  to  the  license  agreement  have  market  shares  below 20%
(competitors)  and  30  %  (non-competitors),  tying  is  block  exempted.  There  are  several  anti-
96 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
97 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
98 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
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competitive effects that can occur due to tying. Foreclosure of suppliers of the tied product is one
effect that might occur. When a licensee is tied to more than one technology from the licensor, he is
prevented  from  switching  to  other  substitutable  technologies  since  he  would  face  increased
royalties. This may decreases competition. There are however some efficiency gains that can be
seen. If the tied product is necessary to ensure a satisfying exploitation of the first technology it can
be a way to ensure the licensor quality in the product that uses his technology. There are also other
cases  where  the  licensor  may have  a  legitimate  interest  in  tying  another  product  to  the  base
technology. If the licensee uses the licensor's brand or similar quality mark, the licensor might be
entitled to require the licensee to license technologies that can ensure the quality that the licensor is
associated with. The tying may give the licensee benefits as well. The tied technology might make it
possible for the licensee to exploit the tying technology more efficiently and this could save him
costs.99
Tying in the business of software licensing can be that you have to buy hardware to get the software
that  you wish  to  license.  This  can be  restrictive  on  competition  if  the  parties  are  big  enough.
However, if the hardware and the software are closely connected and can not be replaced without
changing the nature of the system, there is no tying situation. Tying of software is more common
regarding Article 82 EC. When companies are in a dominant position they have a better position for
forcing  the  other  party  to  accept  a  tying  clause.  There  is  one  relative  new decision  from the
European Commission that may be of interest. The decision concerns Microsoft and the way they
tied together the Windows operating system and the Windows Media Player. This will be discussed
under chapter 7.  
Non-compete obligations 
The licensor might impose on the licensee an obligation not to use third party technologies which
compete with the licensed technology. These kind of obligations  are block exempted up to the
market share thresholds of 20 % and 30 %. As with so may other of the common restraints in a
license obligation  the  main competitive  risk  is  the  foreclosure  of  third  party technologies.  If  a
substantial  part  of the  licensees  in  one market  are tied to one licensor,  they are with  the non-
compete  obligation  prevented  from  exploiting  new  technologies.  Foreclosure  effects  may  also
appear. It might be hard for competitors to enter the market if a licensor has almost all actors on a
certain level  tied to him by non-compete obligations. This may lead to a similarity in technologies
being used on the market. Some of the positive effects with non-compete obligations may be that
the restraints may promote dissemination of technology. The licensor might be more willing to
99 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements 
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license to a licensee if he knows that there is no risk of the technology or know-how is used in
combination  with  a  competing  technology.  In  some  cases  a  non-compete  obligation  may  be
necessary to ensure that the licensee invests in the licensed technology. There are also cases where
the licensor undertakes to make certain investments specifically for one licensee. To make sure that
such  investments  are  made  it  might  be  necessary with  non-compete  obligations  to  ensure  the
licensor that he gets pay of for his investments.100 
Grant back licenses
In many cases exclusive grant back licenses to severable improvements of a technology will reduce
the licensees incentive to innovate since he will not be able to exploit his own technology in the way
he would have been without the grant back obligation. The improvement can not be licensed to a
third party and the licensee may not be able to recoup the investments that has to be made. It still
has to be assessed if the grant back obligation can have any effect on the competitive market within
the Community. If the licensor has a strong position on the market or his technology is a dominant
technology it is likely that the grant back obligation will affect competition in an undesirable way. If
a grant back obligation is included in agreements within a network of companies the impact of these
type of agreements can be even bigger than the impact from agreements between just two actors. If
there is a cross licensing agreement between two or more actors, the risk of negative effects are
bigger than if there is a one way grant back obligation. If competitors share improvements with each
other and exclude others from these technologies, the rest of the market can be prevented from
gaining a competitive lead over the companies that participate in the cross licensing.101   
Technology Pools
Since the  TTBER only covers  agreements between two parties,  agreements  that  are made in  a
technology pool has to be assessed individually. The guidelines to the TTBER can be helpful. In
many cases the pools can be restrictive on competition but there are some pro-competitive effects to
technology pools as well. The creation of “one-stop-shops” can help reducing the transaction costs
and make it  easier  for  the licensees to  have an overview over their  license portfolio.  The pro-
competitive  effects  are  especially  clear  when  the  technologies  concerned  are  essential,
complementary  and  not  substitutable.  If  the  license-in  and  license-out  arrangements  are  non-
exclusive,  the access to  the technology is  non-discriminatory and the technology is  licensed on
terms that  are fair  and reasonable there is  also a  chance that  the technology pools will  lead to
100 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
101 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements 
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competitive benefits.102 
 
What is important to think about when assessing if a technology pool creates anti-competitive risks
or has an efficiency-enhancing potential the relationship between the pooled technologies and their
relationship  with  technologies  outside  the  pool  is  important.  In  this  respect  it  is  has  to  be
distinguished between technological complements and substitutes, and between essential and non-
essential technologies. If a substitute technology is included in a pool this can be considered to
restrict competition to an extent that would not allow for an exemption. One negative effect could
be  that  royalties  become  higher  because  licensees  do  not  benefit  from  rivalry  between  the
technologies in question. If the predominant part of the pool is composed of substitute technologies,
unlawful price fixing cartels might be the result of the arrangement.103 Individual licenses granted by
the pool to third-party licensees are treated in the same manner as any other licence agreement, i.e.
they benefit from a safe harbour if the conditions laid down in the TTBER are met.
Software specific clauses
In license agreements that concern software there are often clauses that are not common in other
technology transfer agreements. I will mention some these clauses and try to explain what rules that
apply to these. The TTBER does not always regulate these clauses in the best way since the block
exemption isn't adapted to the software industry. 
When looking at the clauses specific to software licensing it is important to have knowledge about
the Council Directive on the legal protection on computer programs104. As mentioned above this is
this directive that specifies that software shall be protected as copyright. 
Article  5  and 6 of  the Directive limits  the  rights  of the rightholder.  A licensor  of  a computer
program can not limit the licensees right to use the licensed program in such a way that it prevents
the licensee to take advantage of the program according to  the license.  Unless  it  is  considered
necessary, the licensor can not prevent the licensee from making back up copies. As mentioned in
chapter 4 above, Article 5 allows the rightful user of a computer program to observe, study or test
the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas behind the program. This is allowed
if it is done as a part of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program. Limiting
this in the licensee would be a breach against the software directive.  
102 www.benelux.les-europe.org
103 www.benelux.les-europe.org
104 Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42 “The Software directive”
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Decompiling is sometimes regulated in the license. The licensor has the right to forbid decompiling
to a certain extent. If it was not at all possible to prevent decompiling the will to license would
probably  be  decreased.  It  is  not  allowed  to  limit  the  licensees  possibility  to  decompiling  if
decompiling is necessary to achieve interoperability of independently created computer programs.105
5.11 Connections to other block exemptions
There are several  other agreements about  technology besides technology transfer.  It  is  therefore
interesting  to  look  at  the  connection  between  the  TTBER  and  other  block  exemptions.  Some
situations that are not covered by the TTBER will be covered by other block exemptions. 
The Block Exemption on specialization and R&D agreements (No 2658/2000)
This block exemption includes situations where two or more undertakings enter into agreements for
joint production of one or more technologies. It does also include regulations about transfer or use
of intellectual property under the condition that this is not the main purpose with the agreement.
Regulation 2658/2000 will also cover situations where undertakings form a joint company and give
this company licenses to use technology owned by the mother companies. The situation where some
companies agree to conduct joint research will also be covered by this block exemption.106
 The Block Exemption regulation on vertical agreements (No 2790/1999)
This block exemption covers agreements entered into by two or more undertakings on different
levels of the production or distribution chain and that concerns conditions for the parties purchase,
sell  or  resell  of  certain  goods  or  services.  This  includes  supply  and  distribution  agreements.
Considering that the TTBER only covers agreements between two parties and that a licensee that
sells products that include the licensed technology is considered to be a distributer according to
regulation  No  2790/1999  these  two  regulations  are  closely connected.  The  agreement  that  the
licensor and the licensee enters into will be covered by regulation No 772/2004, the TTBER and the
agreement between a licensee and the buyer will be covered by regulation No 2790/1999. However,
the TTBER will cover agreements where the licensee's sales are regulated. The conditions about for
example distribution systems has however to be consistent with regulation No 2790/1999.107
105 Jerner, Magdalena, Licensavtal för datorprogram, pg. 40
106 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, pg.57-60
107 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements, pg.57-60
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6. Individual Assessment
Agreements that fall outside the scope of the TTBER has to be individually assessed to see if they
are in compliance with the competition rules of the European Community or not. Agreements that
fall  outside  the  block  exemption  is  for  instance  agreements  between  more  than  two parties  or
agreements  between  parties  that  have  market  shares  above  the  market  share  thresholds  in  the
TTBER. To be considered to be in compliance with the EC competition rules the agreement has to
fall within Article 81(1) EC meaning that it does not restrict competition at all or the agreement has
to fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 81(3) EC. It has to be remembered that just because an
agreement falls outside the scope of the TTBER is is not illegal.
When trying to determine if a agreement is caught by Article 81(1) EC, there are several relevant
factors that has to be taken into consideration. The first one is of course the market. If a market is
very mature and not changing much, negative effects are more likely to occur than in a market that
is more dynamic. The nature of the agreement is also an important factor. What is looked at  is
mainly the competitive relationship between the parties to the agreement and also the restrains that
the  agreement  contains.  It  can  also  be  important  to  go  beyond  what  the  agreement  actually
expresses. In some cases, implicit restraints can be found if the implementation of the agreement is
studied.  The  market  power  of  the  parties  will  be  important  when  determining  what  effect  the
agreement will have on the market. The higher the market share is the more likely negative effects
are. Market shares are discussed a lot in the TTBER and the calculation modules that are used there
can be helpful when looking at agreements falling outside the block exemption. The market strength
of the actors that are parties to the agreement is compared to the market strength of competitors. The
more competitors there are on the market, and the stronger they are the less chance of negative
effects. 
For  individual  actors  on  the  market  it  will  in  many  cases  be  difficult  to  asses  whether  their
agreement is caught by Article 81(1) or not. There are guidelines as seen above and there will also
be case law from national competition authorities and eventually also from the ECJ. Still, every case
is unique and market shares and other conditions have to be assessed in every case. When it comes
to market shares things like subsequent changes has to be taken into account108. This might create a
problem for companies that are close to the market share threshold.
108 Comments of the Working Group “Competition Law of Licensing Agreements” at the Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (Munich) on the draft Commission Regulation on the application of
Article 81(3)  of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements,  and on the draft Guidelines on the
application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements
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7. Dominant position and licensing 
There are two issues that has to be considered when it comes to Article 82 and intellectual property
rights. Firstly, intellectual property can be said to put the holder in a dominant position. Secondly, it
has to be questioned whether it constitutes an abuse of dominant position to hold, acquire or exploit
intellectual property rights. The kind of monopoly that intellectual property creates can not be seen
as  exactly  the  same  kind  of  monopoly as  the  one  referred  to  in  competition  law.  There  is  a
difference between legal monopoly, as the one IP creates, and an economic monopoly.109 
There is one area of tension between IP and Article 82 that can be identified as the main problem. It
has to  do with whether it  is  an abuse or not  to refuse to allow others to use the rights  of the
dominant  company. It  is  obvious  that  the  existence  of  intellectual  property rights  will  prevent
undertakings to compete on certain  markets.  It  is  not  therefore clear that  an undertaking has  a
dominant position.
Article 82 is important for licensing when it comes to situations where a dominant actor, that holds
an intellectual property right refuses to license this right to anyone. When it comes to patents there
are rules in most national patent legislations. This is not the case with the copyright systems or
software copyright systems and therefore refusal to supply intellectual property rights are a bigger
problem regarding copyrights and design. The first time the ECJ considered this issue was in two
cases  that  concerned  spare  parts  for  cars110.  It  held  that  the  right  to  prevent  third  parties  from
manufacturing, selling or importing, without the owners consent, is the very subject matter of the
rights  of  protected designs.  An obligation  to  license  would therefore  deprive  the  owner  of  the
substance of its exclusive right. A refusal to license can therefore not in itself constitute an abuse of
a dominant position.  The most  important thing with this  statement  from the ECJ is “in  itself  ”
because the Court went on to say that the exercise of an exclusive right may infringe Article 82 if it
involves certain abusive conduct. This can for example be charging unreasonable high price for a
license or more specific to the case, to refuse to supply independent repairers with spare parts. The
last statement was analogously used in the case Magill111 where the question concerned the refusal
of various broadcasting authorities to allow a would-be publisher of a comprehensive television
listings  magazine  to  publish  their  program  schedule.  112 The  ECJ  stated  that  it  was  only  in
`exceptional  circumstances'  that  a  refusal  to  license  copyright  information  could  be  held  to  be
109 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 763
110 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng [1988] E.C.R 6211 and Case 53/87, CICCRA v. Renault [1988] E.C.R 6039
111 Case C-241-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] E.C.R I-743, on appeal from Case T-69-70/89, RTE, ITP,
BBC v. EC Commission [1991] E.C.R II-485, on appeal from Magill TV Guide [1989] OJ L78/43
112 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, pg. 767
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contrary to Article 82 of the Treaty and its owners be subject to a remedy of a compulsory license.113
The Magill-case is important for the software industry since it is about compilation, even if it is not
electronic compilation. The first judgment in the Magill-case came at about the same time as the
computer programs directive114 and in the judgment it was expressed that it should be applied to
software.115
In the IMS case116 the ECJ seemed to make it a point to indicate that although the Magill conditions
were  cumulative,  they  did  not  offer  an  exhaustive  definition  of  the  test  of  `exceptional
circumstances';  it  carefully  referred  to  Magill  as  a  case  in  which  the  Court  held  that  `such
exceptional circumstances were present in the case ... ' . The Court also held `that it is clear from the
case law ... that "it is sufficient" (rather than "it is necessary") to satisfy the three Magill criteria in
order to show an abusive refusal to license'117.
7.1  Interoperability
In the information technology sector there is a particular kind of refusal to supply that can arise in
respect of “interface information”.  When companies provide software they need to make products
that can operate together with other systems and programs and with hardware. This is what is called
interoperability.  To  make  a  product  compatible  with  others  it  requires  access  to  interface
information  which  is  information  about  the  systems  and  programs  of  other  products.  This
information  might  be  protected  by  intellectual  property  rights.  It  may  be  obtainable  by
decompilation but this might be impossible or not practically feasible. If one undertaking has such a
significant market power on the software market it may be crucial  to the competitors that their
products are compatible with those of the dominant undertaking.
There are some cases from the ECJ and some decisions from the Commission that has dealt with
interoperability. The first time the Commission addressed this was in 1984 and it concerned IBM's
System/370.  The Commission  alleged that  IBM had abused its  dominant  position  by failing to
supply other manufacturers with interface information needed to make competitive products work
with  IBM's  System/370.  A  settlement  was  reached  and  IBM undertook  to  disclose  sufficient
information to enable competitors to attach hardware and software to System/370.118
113 Anderman, S, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of Innovation
114 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs 
115 Jerner, Magdalena, Licensavtal för datorprogram, 1998
116 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, [2004] 4 CMLR 1543
117 Ibid, para 36
118 XIVth Report on Competition Policy (Commission 1984) parts 94-5
46
Licensing in the perspective of EC Competition Law                                                                   Camilla Johansson
The Microsoft Decision
In  1998  the  Commission  opened  an  investigation  into  the  software  company  Microsoft.  The
decision given in 2004 has gotten a lot  of attention in the press and I will  briefly go into this
decision. The investigation focused on two different parts. I will start with giving an overview of the
first part of the decision and explain what the outcome was. I will than shortly explain the second
part of the decision even if that refers more to tying and bundling than licensing. 
The investigation was opened due to a complaint by Sun Microsystems. The complaint from Sun
concerned the refusal of Microsoft to disclose sufficient interface information to enable Sun and
other  actors  to  create  workgroup server  operating  systems that  would  operate  with  Microsoft's
Windows desktop and server operating systems. Microsoft  has about 95 % of the PC operating
system market and consumers buying workgroup servers wants to have products that can operate
together  with  Windows  and  other  applications  from  Microsoft.  Microsoft  argued  that  their
competitors  could  access  the  relevant  information  by  reverse  engineering  and  thereby achieve
interoperability. The Commission agreed that reverse engineering might be possible but that reverse
engineering  of  programs  such  as  Windows  would  require  “considerable  efforts  with  uncertain
chances of success”119 and that the viability of the products produced would depend on Microsoft
not breaking the compatibility by for instance upgrading the operating system and not making it
backwards compatible.120
Further Microsoft argued that if the Commission would find the refusal to supply interoperability
information to be an abuse this would “upset the careful balance between copyright and competition
policies”121 struck by the Software Directive122.  Microsoft pleaded an ingenious interpretation of
Article  6  of  the  Software  Directive.  According to  their  reasoning they were already disclosing
sufficient information and had therefore not committed an abuse of Article 82. Microsoft argued
that the full interoperability that is required by the directive was satisfied when all of the functions
of  the  developer's  program  could  be  accessed  from  a  Windows  client  operating  system.  This
argument was rejected by the Commission and they held that “information necessary to ensure that
the  decompiled  program  works  as  intended  in  interoperating  with  the  independently  created
program is information covered by the derogation provided by Article 6”123.
119 Commission Decision C(2004)900 final of 24 March 2004 relating to proceedings under Article 82 of the EC Treaty
(Case COMP/C-3/37.392 Microsoft)
120 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, p. 458, 512 and 762 
121 Microsoft's submission of 17 Nov. 2000, see para 743 of the Microsoft Decision (COMP/C-3/37.792)
122 See above chapter 4
123 The Microsoft Decision, para 762
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A third argument that was rejected by the Commission was that Microsoft considered that if it was
required to disclose interface information that would go beyond what could be ascertained through
reverse  engineering  under  Article  6  it  would  amount  to  a  compulsory license  which  was  not
consistent with the Community's obligations under TRIPS124.
The Commission's final decision on this point was that Microsoft had to, “within 120 days of the
date  of  notification  of  this  Decision,  make  the  Interoperability  Information  available  to  any
undertaking having an interest in developing and distributing work group server operating system
products and shall, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, allow the use of the Interoperability
Information by such undertakings for the purpose of developing and distributing work group server
operating system”125. The Commission emphasized that Microsoft was under no obligation to reveal
source code. A fine on almost 500 million € was also imposed. Microsoft appealed for suspension
of the operation of certain articles126 in the Commission Decision but the request was rejected by the
CFI.
The second part of the decision related to tying. Microsoft supplied its Windows Media Player as a
package with its Windows operating system. According to the Commission's final statement this
tying meant that competition from other media players was stifled since it lead to a circle where
WMP caused companies such as software developers to  develop products  geared to the WMP.
Thereby  the  WMP  became  even  more  attractive  to  consumers.  The  Commission  said  that
Microsofts conduct “weakens competition on the merits, stifles product innovation, and ultimately
reduces consumers choice”. The outcome was that Microsoft, within 90 days from the decision had
to supply the European market with a version of Windows that did not incorporate the WMP.127 
Conclusions of the Microsoft decision
This  decision has been given a lot  of attention and it  is  interesting to note that the US Justice
Department has expressed that it does not like the Commission decision on the media player part.
Assistant  Attorney General  for  Antitrust,  R.  Hewitt  Pate,  who was  the  one  writing the  Justice
Departments statement on the Commissions decision calls it unfortunate that this kind of fine is
imposed in an area of unilateral competitive conduct since this is “controversial area of antitrust
enforcement”128. The decision on interoperability has not been that criticized by the US since it is a
decision that is more overlapping with the US approach.129 
124 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
125 The Microsoft Decision, Article 5(a)
126 Articles 4, 5(a) to (c) and 6(a)
127 Jones, A and Sufrin, B, “EC Competition Law”, page 458
128 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/202976.htm
129 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/202976.htm
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When reading at the Microsoft decision it can be found that the Commission, in a way, says that the
essential functions of an IP right has a limit where the information protected is an essential facility.
This means that there has to be a balance between individual rewards for creativity and the general
public good of innovation. It can however be hard to determine when interoperability is an essential
facility. How much interoperability can be said to be essential? If we require interoperability to a
certain degree, will it hinder innovation?130
130 Carsten Reimann, Essential Function vs Essential Facility: Defining the amount of R&D protection in high-tech
industries after IMS and Microsoft
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8. Concluding Comments
8.1 Licensing in Europe
Competition policy has had a huge impact on the creation of a single market within the European
Union. The competition rules has also played an important role in the Community's development.
So has IPR and licensing. Licensing of technology and IPR's are big markets that becomes more and
more important. However, licensing can create both negative and positive effects on the competitive
climate within the Community. It is considered to be positive if technology is spread and made
accessible to more than one actor on the market. By licensing IPR's this can be made possible and
the IPR holder has control over the technology. At the same time they get revenues which hopefully
is used for development of better products. Licensing may also create anti-competitive effect on the
market. There might be an increased risk of collusion and inter-technology competition between
competitors that produce products on the basis of the same technology may be reduced131.
Licensing of software is an area that is increasing rapidly and that up until last year has been not
been  covered  by  the  Technology Transfer  Block  Exemption.  When  the  new  TTBER  came  it
included software but there are still differences that has to be considered when comparing licensing
of  “regular” technology and software.  There are  often some other  clauses  included in software
licensing agreements than in other agreements. It can be argued that these differences has not been
analysed enough before the decision was taken to include software in the TTBER. Time will show if
the TTBER will fill its function regarding software or if there needs to be any changes made to
adopt this block exemption to the software industry or if the software industry will have to adopt to
the TTBER.
8.2 TTBER
The competition rules in the EC has gone through a change recently and to create coherence the
TTBER needed to be changed. From being a rather formalistic regulation we now have a regulation
that is supposed to take a more economic and effect-based approach.132  
The new TTBER has in many ways made technology transfer easier. As said above, software is now
included in the block exemption and is therefore more equal to other technology. However, the fact
that software has been included in the TTBER has also led to problems. The TTBER is not really
131 Draft  Commission Notice,  guidelines  on the application of  Article 81  of  the  EC Treaty to  technology transfer
agreements
132 Commission Evaluation Report on the transfer of Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation N. 240/96
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written to suit  licensing of software. The block exemption is still  aimed at  regulation the “old”
technology transfer, such as patented technology or technology that is used to manufacture certain
physical products. 
The fact that individual exemptions no longer are granted by the Commission has made people
believe that it is all up to the companies now, without having any guidance. That might not be really
true. It is up to the companies to make the first assessment but the national competition authorities
will have the power to supervise the actions of the companies and a case law will be developed very
soon. This  will  give the companies  something to  lean  back  on and use when they make their
assessments.
8.2 Dominant position and licensing
Regarding dominant position and licensing the focus of this thesis has been interoperability even if
some other things has been mentioned. When it comes to dominant position and licensing there are
many questions that has to be answered before a case is settled. The question about whether a firm
is dominant or not has a lot to do with market shares. How they are calculated is complicated and a
subject that would require a thesis of its own to clarify. Once dominance is established the question
about abuse comes in. Not supplying competitors with information to make interoperability possible
has in more than one case been seen as an abuse. However, there has to be limits to when this kind
of refusal is an abuse or not. IPR's are supposed to protect innovators rights and it has been argued
that the requirements to supply information for interoperability can limit the incentive to innovate.
Therefore  it  is  of  great  importance  that  there  is  a  balance  between  these  two  factors.  If
interoperability  would  not  be  possible  to  the  extent  that  it  is,  innovation  would  be  hindered.
Companies would not be able to develop products that interoperate with others and the consumers
would be limited in their choice. On the other hand, if the requirements to supply information for
interoperability is drawn to far, we risk ending up in a situation where companies do not want to put
resources in innovation since their competitors will get a “free ride”. The Commission made it clear
in the Microsoft decision that revealing source code was not included in the information that the
company had to release. This way the company that originally came up with the idea will still have
an advantage when it comes to the development of products.
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